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Substitution Effects in Intertemporal Problems
by Davide Dragone, and Paolo Vanin
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The law of demand is a basic concept in economics: when the price of a good increases,
one typically expects a reduction in the quantity demanded. This basic insight from static
consumer theory does not necessarily extend to an intertemporal framework, in which cur-
rent choices produce effects that persist over time. Think, for instance, of labor supply
choices that affect human capital accumulation, or medical care affecting individual health.
In this paper we show that the law of demand fails when the effects of current choices
are amplified over time. In this case, after a price increase, the quantity demanded increases
at some point in time. Consider, as an example, the accumulation of health deficits, which
typically happens at a faster rate, the higher the number of existing health deficits. If
medical care becomes more expensive and one reacts by reducing medical care today, health
deficits will accumulate, and this will happen at faster and faster rate over time. Ultimately,
to avoid excessive health deficits, medical care will need to progressively increase until it is
higher than it would have been without the price increase. In this case after a price increase
the quantity demanded falls in the short run and increases in the long run. We show that
this outcome occurs when a consumer is relatively impatient. The opposite case, which
corresponds to an increase in medical care in the short run, and a subsequent reduction in
the long run, occurs if she is sufficiently patient.
The case presented above features self-productivity, which occurs when there is a positive
feedback that amplifies current behavior. When instead the effects of current actions get
dampened over time, a case called self-depletion, we show that price increases induce lower
levels of consumption at any point in time. In this case, the static intuition of the law
of demand extends better to dynamic consumer behavior. Notably, however, consumption
needs not decrease progressively over time. On the contrary, there can be an overreaction in
the short run (i.e., a large consumption drop), which is then followed by a partial recovery
in the long run. To highlight the contrast between static and dynamic consumer theory in
the sharpest way, we characterize dynamic reactions to a price increase abstracting from
income effects, that is in a context in which the law of demand necessarily holds in a static
framework.
2
1 Introduction
Price effects and intertemporal choices are at the heart of economic analysis. In static
consumer problems with two goods, it is well known that substitution effects are always
negative, so that consumers respond to an increase in the relative price of a good by re-
ducing its consumption. In dynamic extensions of such problems, in which present choices
affect future conditions through some relevant state variable, such as habit, human capital
or health, consumers’ response may be substantially different. While this has long been
informally known, perhaps surprisingly no general characterization is available.
In this paper, we characterize substitution effects for a broad class of intertemporal
consumer and worker problems. We identify time discounting and self-productivity as key
determinants. A state variable is self-productive or self-depleting, depending on whether
it contributes positively or negatively to its own accumulation. Under self-productivity
we show that dynamic substitution effects have opposite sign in the short and in the long
run, with the discount rate determining whether consumption initially falls and eventu-
ally increases, or the other way around. Under self-depletion, instead, short and long-run
responses have the same negative sign.
As en example, think of an agent that chooses between schooling and working over time.
If human capital is self-productive (i.e., if the net production of new “knowledge” increases
in the agent’s stock of existing “knowledge”), we show that a wage increase induces patient
agents to work less and study more in the short run, in order to work more and reap the
benefits of the larger stock of human capital in the long run; impatient agents respond in the
opposite way. If human capital is instead self-depleting (for instance due to depreciation),
short and long-run responses have the same sign: after a wage increase agents work more
both in the short and in the long run and invest less in human capital.
Our results contribute to different strands of literature. First, we characterize dynamic
substitution effects in a general setup. This sheds light on the key assumptions on self-
productivity and discounting that produce differences and commonalities among the appar-
ently widely different models of health behavior, human capital, endogenous preferences,
addiction and habit formation that originate from Grossman, 1972; Blinder and Weiss, 1976;
Stigler and Becker, 1977; Becker and Murphy, 1988; Carroll et al., 2000.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the comparative statics and compar-
ative dynamics properties of intertemporal optimization models (see, among others, Oniki,
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1973, Epstein, 1978, Otani, 1982, and Caputo, 1990, 1997). We show under which con-
ditions dynamic substitution effects are positive or negative. An empirical implication is
that heterogeneity in individual discount rates can produce an attenuation bias in estimated
price responses. This result is particularly relevant when writing and solving computational
models that estimate the dynamic responses to tax changes or income subsidies (see Hall,
2010, and Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012, for an overview). An implication for policy making
is that there are conditions under which policies that seem effective in the short run backfire
in the long run, and vice versa.
Third, our paper relates to the literature on taxation in models with endogenous human
capital, which has devoted substantial attention to the role of asymmetric information, age-
dependent taxation and stochastic returns, but less to the aspects that are the focus of the
present paper.1 We take a complementary perspective: we abstract from all those elements
to show in the cleanest way how the short and long-run response to labor income taxes
depend on the interplay between self-productivity and time discounting. More broadly, we
contribute to the large literature on taxation in dynamic models investigating, e.g., health
behavior, addiction or obesity (see Cawley and Ruhm, 2012, for an overview).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the general intertemporal problem
and the main results. Sections 3 and 4 specialize the results to consumer and labor supply
problems. Section 5 concludes.
2 An intertemporal consumer/worker problem
Consider the following intertemporal model, which nests consumer and labor supply prob-
lems as special cases:
max
x,y
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU (x (t) , y (t) , Z (t)) dt (1)
s.t. Z˙ (t) = f (x (t) , Z (t)) (2)
A˙ (t) = rA(t) +M (t) + g (x (t) , Z (t) , p)− y (t) (3)
A (0) = A0, Z(0) = Z0 (4)
1See Makris and Pavan (2018) for a discussion, and in particular, among others, the works of Kapicˇka
(2006, 2015); Krause (2009); Best and Kleven (2013); Stantcheva (2017); Kapicˇka and Neira (2019).
4
where x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0 are consumption goods, Z is any form of “capital” (say, human
capital, habit, health or addiction), and A represents assets.2 Equation (2) describes the
law of motion of state variable Z, and equation (3) describes the dynamic budget constraint.
Parameter ρ > 0 is the intertemporal discount rate. To maintain generality, we make no
functional form assumptions on utility or the law of motion of Z.3
Based on equation (2), we introduce the following classification (subscripts denote partial
derivatives):
Definition 1 State variable Z is self-depleting if fZ < 0, and self-productive if fZ > 0.
The case of self-depleting Z covers all intertemporal problems where the state variable
contributes to its dynamics only through depreciation. This is the case, for instance, of
Grossman (1972)’s health accumulation model, Becker and Murphy (1988)’s model of ra-
tional addiction, and the models of habits formation considered in Carroll et al. (2000) and
Chetty and Szeidl (2016), which share the common assumption Z˙ = f (x)−δZ with f, f′ > 0.
The case of self-productive Z includes the models of human capital considered, among oth-
ers, in Weiss (1972) and Cunha and Heckman (2007), or Dalgaard and Strulik (2014)’s
model of health deficit accumulation, in which the state variable contributes to its own ac-
cumulation according to Z˙ = f (Z)− x. In richer models where, e.g., Z˙ = f (x, Z)− δZ, the
state variable can be self-depleting under certain conditions, and self-productive in others,
as shown in the labor supply models treated in Section 4.
Equation (3) represents the dynamics of asset accumulation, where r is the interest
rate, M ≥ 0 is an exogenous instantaneous income flow and y is the numeraire good. The
formulation of (3) is flexible enough to encompass consumption as well as labor supply
choices. In consumer problems, g(x, Z, p) = m(Z) − px, where m(Z) is the endogenous
component of income (if any) and px is expenditure on x at the relative price p. Hence in
a consumer problem the budget constraint equation becomes
A˙ = rA+M +m(Z)− px− y (5)
In labor supply problems, g(x, Z, p) = pL(x, Z), and the budget constraint is
A˙ = rA+M + pL(x, Z)− y (6)
2Henceforth the time arguments are omitted to simplify notation.
3The case where the evolution of Z also depends on y, i.e., Z˙ = f(x, y, Z) is studied in the Appendix.
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where x represents leisure, L(x, Z) is effective labor (which may depend on Z, e.g. if Z is
human capital), Lx < 0, and p is the market wage of effective labor.
Problem (1)-(4) is solved applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle, as detailed in the
Appendix. We assume concavity of the corresponding Hamiltonian function, that the mar-
ket interest rate r is equal to the discount rate ρ, and that price changes are compensated to
keep the marginal utility of assets constant (for a similar approach see, e.g., Heckman, 1974;
Becker and Murphy, 1988). This form of compensation is convenient because it neutralizes
income effects, so that dynamic price effects are entirely driven by dynamic substitution
effects.4 The corresponding system of optimal trajectories for x and y is
x˙ =
Hyy
H2xy −HxxHyy
[(fZ − ρ) (Ux + gxUy)− fx (UZ + gZUy)] (7)
y˙ = −HxyHyy x˙ (8)
where H represents the Hamiltonian function associated to the maximization problem.
Equating to zero expressions (2), (3), (7), and (8) yields the steady state
(
xL, yL, ZL, AL
)
.
Our goal is to establish how an unexpected permanent change in price affects consumption
when the system is at a steady state with saddle-point stability. For expositional simplicity,
in the proceeding we focus on x and Z, and we report the corresponding analysis for y and
A in the Appendix.
We investigate dynamic substitution effects over two different time-horizons. The short-
run effect describes the consumption response on impact, when the price change is an-
nounced and implemented. The short-run effect is computed considering the policy function
xˆ(Z,A) leading to the steady state and computing xSp ≡ ∂xˆ
(
ZL, AL
)
/∂p.5 The long-run
effect describes the change in the steady state values xLp ≡ ∂xL/∂p and ZLp ≡ ∂ZL/∂p.
Proposition 1 Consider an unexpected permanent change in price p, occurring when all
variables are at their saddle-point-stable steady state level, and compensated to maintain the
4The main insights generalize to the case in which the interest rate depends on the level of assets, as it is
common in macroeconomic models, and price changes are not compensated to maintain the marginal utility
of wealth constant (see Dragone and Vanin, 2015).
5Under specific assumptions one can write the closed-form expression of xˆ(Z,A) as, e.g., in Becker and
Murphy (1988)’s rational addiction model. For our results, however, this is not needed.
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marginal utility of wealth constant. The short and long-run responses of x and Z are
xSp = a [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ)gxp] ε (9)
xLp = a [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ)gxp] fZ (10)
ZLp = −a [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ) gxp] fx (11)
where concavity and saddle-point stability imply a, ε, fx/fZ < 0.
Term ε is the negative eigenvalue associated to the Jacobian matrix computed at the
steady state, whereas a is a function of the primitives of the model (see equations 65 and 74
in the Appendix). Given that the expression in square brackets is the same in all equations,
the relation between the short and long-run price response is particularly simple:
Proposition 2 The short and long-run price responses are related as follows:
xLp =
fZ
ε
xSp (12)
ZLp = −
fx
fZ
xLp . (13)
Hence:
• If Z is self-depleting:
– xSp and x
L
p have the same sign
– Demand for x is more elastic in the short run than in the long run if fZ > ε,
and more rigid otherwise,
• If Z is self-productive, xSp and xLp have opposite sign,
• ZLp has the same sign as xLp .
These results are general and they highlight the importance of self-productivity and self-
depletion for the sign and magnitude of price responses over time. The following sections,
focusing on consumer and labor supply problems, show how the interplay between self-
productivity and time discounting determines the specific sign of the short and long-run
price response.
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3 Consumer problem
In a consumer problem, the dynamic budget constraint is (5) because gpZ = 0 and gxp = −1.
Hence the price responses (9)-(11) of Proposition 1 simplify as follows
xSp = a(fZ − ρ)ε (14)
xLp = a (fZ − ρ) fZ (15)
ZLp = −a (fZ − ρ) fx (16)
This allows being more specific about the direction of the price responses:
Proposition 3 In a dynamic consumer problem:
1. If Z is self-depleting, price responses of x are always negative and the state variable
Z decreases (xSp , x
L
p , Z
L
p < 0)
2. If Z is self-productive, the sign of price responses depends on ρ relative to fZ . Specif-
ically:
• If the consumer is sufficiently impatient (ρ > fZ) , consumption of x decreases
on impact and increases in the long-run (xSp < 0, x
L
p > 0); the state variable Z
increases (ZLp > 0).
• If the consumer is sufficiently patient (ρ < fZ) , consumption of x increases on
impact and decreases in the long-run (xSp > 0, x
L
p < 0); the state variable Z
decreases (ZLp < 0).
The above Proposition shows how the specific sign of the short and long-run price
response depends on the interplay between fZ and ρ. When Z is self-depleting, a forward-
looking agent substitutes consumption away from the more expensive good and, relative to
the initial steady state, she reduces the quantity demanded at any point in time, as shown
in Figure 1.6 This is similar to what happens in a static model.
A common example of this case are consumer problems in which the law of motion is of
the following kind
Z˙ (t) = xα − δZ (17)
6Whether there is overshooting in the short relative to the long run depends on whether the policy
function is upward or, as in Figure 1, downward sloping.
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xtime
Old steady state
New steady state
Z
time
Old steady state
New steady state
Time path of x Time path of Z
Figure 1: Self-depleting (fZ < 0): Short and long-run response to a price increase. Consumption of
x decreases both on impact and in the long run, with overshooting in the short run if ε < fZ . Left panel:
time path for x. Right panel: time path for Z.
with α ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1) . The interpretation of x and Z depends on the specific
application. In habit models and in rational addiction models, x is consumption and Z
is the addiction stock or the habit stock (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Chetty and Szeidl,
2016). In health accumulation models, x is health investment, and Z is the health condition
(Grossman, 1972; Galama and Kapteyn, 2011). While the role of x and Z in the utility
function depends on the specific model, these differences are irrelevant for our results.7 In
fact, inspection of the dynamics of Z immediately reveals that Z is self-depleting because
fZ = −δ < 0. Hence using Proposition 3 we can immediately predict that price effects are
negative, both in the short and in the long run.
If instead Z is self-productive, whether the short-run response is positive or negative
(remembering that the long-run response has opposite sign), depends on the time discount
rate ρ. The intuition behind this result lies in the tension between self-productivity and
impatience, because self-productivity amplifies over time the consequences of current behav-
ior, while time discounting reduces the relevance of such future consequences. If impatience
dominates (ρ > fZ), present outcomes matter relatively more than future ones and the
agent immediately reduces consumption of good x when it becomes more expensive. The
7For example, in addiction and taste formation models, consumption capital raises the marginal utility
of x (UxZ > 0): the more I listen to music the more I appreciate it, the more I consume drugs, the more I
crave for them. In habit formation models, instead, UxZ < 0: the more I get used to a good, the less I value
it. See Dragone and Ziebarth (2017) for an analysis of the two cases in the context of consumption of novel
vs familiar goods.
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ρ > fZ
x
time
Old steady state
New steady state
time
Old steady state
New steady state
Time path of x Time path of Z
ρ < fZ
x
time
Old steady state
New steady state Z
time
Old steady state
New steady state
Time path of x Time path of Z
Figure 2: Self-productive (fZ > 0): Short and long-run responses of x to a price increase have opposite
sign. After a price increase, a relatively impatient agent (ρ > fZ) reduces consumption on impact (as in a
static model), and increases it in the long run. A relatively patient agent (ρ < fZ) does the opposite: she
increases consumption in the short run and decreases it (as in a static model) in the long run. Left panel:
time path for x. Right panel: time path for Z.
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emphasis on short-run outcomes, however, produces a persistent increase in the state vari-
able that will eventually lead the agent to reverse her initial choice and, in the long run,
increase consumption of x (Figure 2, upper panel).8 If instead the agent is sufficiently
patient (fZ > ρ), in the long run she aims at consuming less of the relatively more expen-
sive good (as in a static model). In order to do so, she is willing to bear the short-run
cost of higher consumption, which persistently decreases Z and, over time, allows for lower
consumption (Figure 2, lower panel).
As an example of self-productivity in consumer problems, consider the case in which
law of motion is
Z˙ = δZ − xα (18)
For instance, this is the case of the Dalgaard and Strulik (2014) and Dragone and Strulik
(2017)’s model of health deficit accumulation, where Z is the stock of health deficits and x
is health care investment. Since Z is self-productive (fZ = δ > 0), health care has opposite
short and long-run price effects (Proposition 2). Accordingly, if the agent is sufficiently
patient, after an increase in the price of health care she will demand more health care in
the short run and less in the long run. If instead she is sufficiently impatient, the opposite
holds (Proposition 3).
4 Labor supply and human capital accumulation
Results are slightly more complex, but qualitatively similar for labor supply problems, in
which budget constraint (6) applies. The price responses (9)-(11) of Proposition 1 are
xSp = a [fxLZ − (fZ − ρ)Lx] ε (19)
xLp = a [fxLZ − (fZ − ρ)Lx] fZ (20)
ZLp = −a [fxLZ − (fZ − ρ)Lx] fx (21)
Comparing these expressions to the analog expressions (14)-(16) of consumer problems,
the only difference is the content in square brackets. Accordingly, one can state the exact
8With self-productivity it must be the case that, in steady state, fx < 0. Hence a short-run reduction
in consumption triggers an increase in the state variable, followed by further subsequent increases due to
self-productivity. Since the policy function is upward-sloping, consumption will track the evolution of the
state variable that was originated by the initial change in consumption.
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equivalent of Proposition 3 (which we do not report here for brevity), with the only difference
that here the critical value of ρ is fZ − fxLZ/Lx, rather than just fZ .
Further insights can be obtained considering an example where, unlike equations (17)
and (18), the sign of fZ in steady state depends on the parameters of the model. Consider a
schooling model where Z is human capital and x is time devoted to schooling.9 The agent’s
problem can be written as:
max
{x,y}
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu (x, y) dt (22)
s.t. Z˙ = xαZγ − δZ (23)
A˙ = rA+M + pL (x, Z)− y (24)
where α, γ, δ > 0, effective labor L(x, Z) is increasing in human capital and decreasing in
non-labor (schooling) time (LZ > 0, Lx < 0), and p is the wage rate of effective labor.
Human capital is produced with schooling and existing human capital, and it depreciates
over time. The law of motion (23) thus entails a self-productive component (the first term)
and a self-depleting component (the second term), whose relative value in steady state only
depends on the value of γ: human capital Z is self-productive in steady state if γ > 1
(i.e., when there are increasing marginal returns to “knowledge” in the production of new
“knowledge”) and self-depleting if γ < 1 (i.e., when marginal returns are decreasing).10
Determining which case is empirically relevant is outside the scope of this paper.11 For
our purposes, it suffices to observe that, due to Proposition 2, whether γ is larger or smaller
than one is enough to predict whether in this model the short and long-run response of
labor supply to a wage increase have the same sign (γ < 1) or opposite sign (γ > 1). In the
9Labor supply models fall into two broad classes: training models, which focus on the direct investment in
human capital through either schooling or on-the-job training (as pioneered in Ben-Porath, 1967; Heckman,
1976; Blinder and Weiss, 1976), and learning-by-doing (or experience) models, which consider human capital
accumulation as a byproduct of work activity (see Arrow, 1962; Weiss, 1972, for seminal contributions). Both
classes of models have been very influential in the literature, and they are both described by problem (1)-(4)
and by (6).
10To see it, observe that in steady state the requirement Z˙ = 0 implies xαZγ−1 = δ. Since fZ = γxαZγ−1−
δ, we can replace and get fZ = δ (γ − 1), which implies that fZ > 0 if and only if γ > 1.
11Heckman et al. (1998) and Kapicˇka (2006, 2015), among others, assume decreasing returns (γ < 1), but
Trostel (2004) presents evidence that marginal returns are increasing (γ > 1) for low levels of human capital
and decreasing (γ < 1) for high levels.
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latter case, under more specific functional assumptions, Proposition 3 allows determining
the conditions under which labor supply first increases and then decreases, or the other way
around.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper studies short and long-run price effects for a broad class of dynamic con-
sumer/worker problems. We provide a theoretical answer to the following simple but fun-
damental questions. Are dynamic substitution effects always negative? Can they change
sign over different time horizons? Can demand be more elastic in the short than in the long
run? On what primitives of the model does it depend?
We first characterize short and long-run price responses in a general model that encom-
passes as special cases models of endogenous preferences, health, and human capital. We
find that short and long-run substitution effects may have opposite sign. Under assumptions
that are commonly used in the literature, this possibility materializes when the state vari-
able is self-productive, a condition that can be satisfied, for instance, in models of human
capital accumulation and endogenous preferences, in which “capital” is an input for its own
accumulation. With self-productive capital, after a price increase impatient agents reduce
consumption today and increase it tomorrow, while patient ones do the opposite. If instead
the state variable is self-depleting, as it easily happens in models with capital depreciation
(including those of rational addiction and health capital), both short and long-run price
responses are negative.
In most models used in the literature, our results allow for an immediate assessment of
the sign of price responses over time by simple inspection of the intertemporal problem. We
illustrate this possibility considering workhorse models of consumption and labor supply
that have been extensively used in the literature. For example, in consumer problems with
health capital (Grossman, 1972, Galama and Van Kippersluis, 2018) the law of motion
features self-depletion, hence health investment is predicted to decrease both in the short
and in the long run when its price increases. On the contrary, health deficit accumulation
models feature self-productivity (Dalgaard and Strulik, 2014), hence the price response in
the short and in the long run will have opposite sign. Models of human capital often involve
a self-productive and a self-depleting element (see, e.g., Ben-Porath, 1967, Heckman, 1976,
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Blinder and Weiss, 1976 and Magnac et al., 2018). In such a case, the determination of
the short and long-run substitution effect depends on which of the two effects dominates in
steady state.
As intertemporal consumer problems are a building block of dynamic macroeconomic
models, our results are also relevant for business cycle and growth theories, although an
explicit analysis of general equilibrium models, possibly with a stochastic component, is
outside the scope of the present paper. While an infinite time horizon is relevant in many
applications and may represent a finite but uncertain life duration, it would be interesting
to extend the analysis to a finite (and certain) time horizon, as well as to the effects of
temporary price changes. This is left for future research.
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A Mathematical appendix
A.1 Solving the general intertemporal problem
In this Appendix we derive the solution for the general intertemporal problem in which the
law of motion depends on both consumption goods and on the state variable Z, i.e.
max
x,y
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU (x (t) , y (t) , Z (t)) dt (25)
s.t. Z˙ (t) = f (x (t) , y (t) , Z (t)) (26)
A˙ (t) = rA(t) +M (t) + g (x (t) , Z (t) , p)− y (t) (27)
A (0) = A0, Z(0) = Z0, (28)
where r = ρ > 0. The case presented in the main text just amounts to assuming that
fy = 0. The associated current-value Hamiltonian function is:
H(x, y, Z,A, µ, λ; p,M) = U (x, y, Z) + λ [rA+M + g(x, Z, p)− y] + µf (x, y, Z) (29)
where λ and µ are the costate variables associated to states A and Z, respectively. The
following conditions are necessary for an internal solution:
Hx = Ux (x, y, Z) + λgx(x, Z, p) + µfx (x, y, Z) = 0 (30)
Hy = Uy (x, y, Z)− λ+ µfy (x, y, Z) = 0 (31)
µ˙ = ρµ−HZ(x, y, Z,A, µ, λ; p,M) (32)
λ˙ = λ (ρ− r) (33)
together with (26), (27), (28), and with the transversality conditions limt→∞ e−ρtµ (t)Z (t) =
0 and limt→∞ e−ρtλ (t)A (t) = 0. The above conditions are also sufficient for a maximum if
H(x, y, Z,A, µ, λ; p,M) is concave in state and control variables (Mangasarian, 1966; Seier-
stad and Sydsaeter, 1977). We assume that this is indeed the case and that Hxx and Hyy
are strictly negative.
The first order conditions (30)-(31) determine the optimal value of x and y as functions
of the state and costate variables, of the market price and of the exogenous component of
income:
x∗ = x∗(Z,A, µ, λ; p,M) (34)
y∗ = y∗(Z,A, µ, λ; p,M). (35)
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Replacing (x∗, y∗) in (26), (27), (32) and (33) yields the optimal dynamics of state and
costate variables:12
Z˙ = f (x∗, y∗, Z) (36)
A˙ = rA+M + g (x∗, Z, p)− y∗ (37)
µ˙ = ρµ−HZ (x∗, y∗, Z,A, µ, λ; p,M) (38)
λ˙ = λ (ρ− r) . (39)
The solution {Z (t) , A (t) , µ (t) , λ (t)} of the above system of differential equations repre-
sents the optimal trajectory of the state and costate variables, given the initial values of the
state variables, the transversality conditions, p and M (among the other variables). This
solution, once plugged in (34) and (35), determines the time-path of x and y.
Note that, since in this model r = ρ, equation (39) implies that the shadow price of
assets is constant over time, λ(t) = λ¯ for all t. In general, λ¯ depends on the parameters of
the model, possibly including market prices and the exogenous component of income, i.e.
λ¯ = λ¯ (p,M). Its specific value is obtained by imposing additional constraints. For example,
one can reasonably assume that assets go to zero (or some positive value) in steady state.
With λ = λ¯, the dimensionality of the system of differential equations effectively reduces
to three equations only (36, 37 and 38). Given the initial values of the state variables
and the transversality conditions, the solution {Z (t) , A (t) , µ (t)} of the reduced system of
differential equations represents the optimal trajectory of the state and costate variables,
which depends on p and M, and that determines the optimal path of x and y.
We focus on solutions leading to a saddle-point-stable steady state
xL = x∗(ZL, AL, µL, λ¯; p,M) (40)
yL = y∗(ZL, AL, µL, λ¯; p,M). (41)
where
ZL = ZL(p,M); AL = AL(p,M); µL = µL(p,M); (42)
are the steady-state values of state and costate variables that satisfy (36), (37) and (38)
with equality.
12Alternatively, one could derive the solution in terms of state and control variables. We opt for the
current procedure to highlight the dynamics of the states and the corresponding shadow prices, and to show
how our method can be applied to problems with any number of control variables.
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To assess the saddle-point stability of the steady state, consider the determinant of the
3-dimensional Jacobian matrix J associated to (36), (37) and (38), with λ = λ¯ :
|J | =ρfZ (ρ− fZ) + ρHxxHyy −H2xy
{
(fyHxZ − fxHyZ)2 −
(
f2yHxx − 2fxfyHxy + f2xHyy
)HZZ
− (2fZ − ρ) [(fyHxy − fxHyy)HxZ + (fxHxy − fyHxx)HyZ ]} . (43)
The steady state has saddle point stability when the Jacobian matrix J admits one negative
eigenvalue ε (there is at most one), implying |J | < 0.
The response of the steady state to price changes determines the long-run price response.
To determine the short-run response, we consider how the saddle path leading to the steady
state changes after a price shock. Notice that the saddle path can either be expressed as a
function of the state variables (the feedback representation of the solution) or as a function
of time (open loop solution, Dockner et al., 2000; Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004). Here we
focus on the feedback representation. As λ is fixed, it will be enough to consider how the
saddle path of µ,
µˆ(Z,A; p,M), (44)
changes when p or M change. This information will be used to obtain the short-run response
of x and y. Plugging (44) into (34) and (35) yields the saddle paths of x and y in feedback
form, i.e., the policy functions of x and y as functions of the state variables, given p and M :
xˆ = xˆ(Z,A; p,M) = x∗(Z,A, µˆ(Z,A; p,M), λ¯ (p,M) ; p,M) (45)
yˆ = yˆ(Z,A; p,M) = y∗(Z,A, µˆ(Z,A; p,M), λ¯ (p,M) ; p,M). (46)
A.2 Long-run substitution effects
Consider (40) and (41). The change of steady state consumption of x after an increase in
price p is computed as follows:
xLp =
∂x∗
∂p
+
∂x∗
∂Z
ZLp +
∂x∗
∂A
ALp +
∂x∗
∂µ
µLp +
∂x∗
∂λ
∂λ¯
∂p
(47)
yLp =
∂y∗
∂p
+
∂y∗
∂Z
ZLp +
∂y∗
∂A
ALp +
∂y∗
∂µ
µLp +
∂y∗
∂λ
∂λ¯
∂p
(48)
where ∂λ¯/∂p = 0 if the price change is compensated so as to leave the marginal value of
assets λ¯ constant.
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To compute the above equations, apply Cramer’s rule to the first order conditions (30)
and (31). This yields:
∂x∗
∂p
= −gxpλ¯
Ω
Hyy ∂y
∗
∂p
=
gxpλ¯
Ω
Hxy (49)
∂x∗
∂Z
=
HxyHyZ −HxZHyy
Ω
∂y∗
∂Z
=
HxyHxZ −HyZHxx
Ω
(50)
∂x∗
∂A
=
∂x∗
∂M
= 0
∂y∗
∂A
=
∂y∗
∂M
= 0 (51)
∂x∗
∂µ
=
fyHxy − fxHyy
Ω
∂y∗
∂µ
=
fxHxy − fyHxx
Ω
(52)
∂x∗
∂λ
= −Hxy + gxHyy
Ω
∂y∗
∂λ
=
Hxx + gxHxy
Ω
(53)
where
Ω = HxxHyy −H2xy, (54)
which is positive by strict concavity. Then consider equations (36), (37) and (38), which
equal zero in steady state, and apply again Cramer’s rule to obtain:
ZLp =
ρλ¯
Ω |J | [gxp (fZ − ρ) (fxHyy − fyHxy)
+f2xgpZHyy + f2y (gpZHxx − gxpHxZ) + (gxpHyZ − 2gpZHxy) fxfy
]
(55)
ALp =
λ¯
Ω |J | {[(HyZ + gZHyy)fx − (Hxy + gx Hyy)fZ ] [(fZ − ρ)gxp − fxgpZ ]
+ [gx (gxpHZZ − gpZHxZ) + gpZ (gZHxx − gxHxZ) + gZ (gx − gxp)HxZ ] f2y
− [gxp (HZZ + gZHyZ)− gpZ (HxZ + 2gZHxy − gxHyZ)] fxfy
− [(Hxx + gxHxy)gpZ − gxp(HxZ + gxHyZ)] fZfy
+(gxHyZ − gZHxy)(fZ − ρ)fygxp}+ gpALM (56)
µLp =
ρλ¯
Ω |J | [(gxpHyZ − gpZHxy) (fZHxy − fxHyZ)− (gxpHZZ − gpZHxZ)(fyHxy − fxHyy)
+(gxpHxZ − gpZHxx) (fyHyZ − fZHyy)] . (57)
Expressions (55) and (56) describe the long-run price effect on Z and A. The long-run price
responses for x and y are found by replacing the above expressions in (47) and (48), which
for the general case yields
xLp = θ [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ) gxp] fZHyy +Dfy (58)
yLp = θ [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ) gxp] (fxHyZ − fZHxy) + Efy (59)
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where
θ = − λ¯ρ
Ω |J | (60)
D = θ {gpZ(fyHxZ − fZHxy − fxHyZ) + gxp [HyZ(2fZ − ρ)− fyHZZ ]} (61)
E = θ [gpZ(fZHxx − fxHxZ) + gxp(fxHZZ − fZHxZ)] . (62)
These general expressions are not particularly insightful per se. Notably, their formulation
simplifies considerably in specific economic applications of interest.
For instance, when fy = 0, as in the class of models considered in Section 2, the long-run
response of x and Z boil down to equations (10) and (11) in Proposition 1,
xLp = a [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ) gxp] fZ (63)
ZLp = −a [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ) gxp] fx, (64)
where
a = θHyy = − λ¯ρ
Ω |J |Hyy < 0. (65)
Moreover, in a consumer problem gpZ = 0 and gxp = −1, hence (63) and (64) further
simplify to equations (15) and (16):
xLp = a (fZ − ρ) fZ (66)
ZLp = −a (fZ − ρ) fx. (67)
As a side result, note that the same procedure can be used to compute the response to a
change in the exogenous component of income. Consider first the long run response:
xLM =
∂x∗
∂M
+
∂x∗
∂Z
ZLM +
∂x∗
∂A
ALM +
∂x∗
∂λ
∂λ¯
∂M
+
∂x∗
∂µ
µLM (68)
yLM =
∂y∗
∂M
+
∂y∗
∂Z
ZLM +
∂y∗
∂A
ALM +
∂y∗
∂λ
∂λ¯
∂M
+
∂y∗
∂µ
µLM . (69)
Since ∂x∗/∂A = ∂x∗/∂M = ∂y∗/∂A = ∂y∗/∂M = ∂ZL/∂M = ∂λ¯/∂M = ∂µL/∂M = 0,
we obtain that, when the marginal utility of wealth is maintained constant, the long run
dynamic income effects at the steady state are nil.
A.3 Short-run substitution effects
To compute short-run price effects, consider (34) and (35) and recall that in the short run
state variables A and Z are given. Given that λ is fixed, the short-run responses of x and y,
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when all variables are at their steady-state level, only depend on the direct effect of price,
and on its indirect effect through the costate variable µ:
xSp =
∂x∗
∂p
+
∂x∗
∂µ
µSp (70)
ySp =
∂y∗
∂p
+
∂y∗
∂µ
µSp . (71)
The terms ∂x∗/∂p, ∂x∗/∂µ, ∂y∗/∂p, ∂y∗/∂µ are described in equations (49) and (52). To
obtain µSp , we need to assess how the saddle path of µ responds to a price change. Even
without knowing its specific functional form, we can approximate it around the steady state.
Take a first-order linear expansion of (36), (37) and (38):

Z˙
A˙
µ˙
 = J ·

Z − ZL
A−AL
µ− µL
 (72)
Consider the eigenvector (1, ξ2, ξ3) associated to the negative eigenvalue ε of the Jacobian
matrix J , with
ξ3 =
1
Φ
[(ε− fZ) Ω + fx (HxZHyy −HxyHyZ) + fy (HxxHyZ −HxZHxy)] (73)
ε =
1
2
(
ρ−
√
ρ2 − 4 |J |
ρ
)
< 0 (74)
Φ = −f2yHxx + 2fxfyHxy − f2xHyy > 0. (75)
The particular solution of the system of ordinary linear differential equations (72) is
Z (t) = ZL + αeεt (76)
A (t) = AL + αeεtξ2 (77)
µ (t) = µL + αeεtξ3 (78)
where α is a constant that depends on initial values. Replacing αeεt = Z (t)− ZL in (78),
yields the feedback solution of µ as a function of the state variable Z only,
µˆ(Z) = µL + (Z − ZL)ξ3. (79)
Taking the derivative of (79) with respect to p yields, for any A, the short-run effect of a
price change is
µSp ≡
∂µˆ(Z)
∂p
= µLp − ξ3ZLp + (Z − ZL)
∂ξ3
∂p
. (80)
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In proximity of ZL, the last term is negligible and the above expression simplifies to
µSp = µ
L
p − ξ3ZLp . (81)
Replacing (81) in (70)-(71) and rearranging yields the short-run price response of x and y:
xSp = C (fxHyy − fyHxy) +
λ¯
Φ
f2y gxp (82)
ySp = C (fyHxx − fxHxy)−
λ¯
Φ
fxfygxp (83)
where
C = εθ
{
gpZ +
gxp
Φ
[(fxHyy − fyHxy)(fZ − ρ) + (fyHxZ − fxHyZ) fy]
}
. (84)
When fy = 0 the above expressions considerably simplify. For example, the short-run
response of x becomes
xSp = aε [fxgpZ − (fZ − ρ)gxp] , (85)
as shown in equation (9) of Proposition 1.
In a consumer problem gpZ = 0 and gxp = −1, hence (85) further simplifies to
xSp = aε(fZ − ρ) (86)
as shown in equation (14).
Note that neither expression depends on assets or income, because income effects are
nil also in the short run. To see it, consider
xSM =
∂x∗
∂M
+
∂x∗
∂µ
µSM (87)
ySM =
∂y∗
∂M
+
∂y∗
∂µ
µSM (88)
Taking the derivative of (79) with respect to M yields
µSM = µ
L
M − ξ3ZLM = 0. (89)
Together with the fact that ∂x∗/∂M = ∂y∗/∂M = 0, we conclude that xSM = y
S
M = 0.
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